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THE POLITICS OF TAKINGS CLAUSES 
Mila Versteeg 
ABSTRACT—A long-standing consensus exists that the arbitrary or 
excessive expropriation of private property by a country hurts its economic 
growth. Although constitutions can play an important role in protecting 
private property, remarkably little is known about how they actually restrict 
the power of eminent domain and whether such restrictions are associated 
with reduced de facto expropriation risks. This Essay fills that gap by 
presenting original data on the procedural and substantive protections in 
constitutional takings clauses from 1946 to 2013. Its main finding is that no 
observable relationship exists between de jure constitutional restrictions on 
the power of eminent domain and de facto expropriation risks.  
 This Essay explores two possible explanations for why 
constitutional restrictions on the power of eminent domain fail to make a 
difference in practice. The first is that countries adopt disingenuous 
promises to bolster their international reputation or to attract foreign aid. 
The second explanation holds that societal disagreements over the desired 
level of expropriation might be built into the constitution’s design. Such 
disagreements emerge when a portion of citizens believe they benefit more 
from expropriation than from the general benefits that flow from secure 
property rights.  
 This Essay finds empirical support for the second explanation. 
Specifically, it finds that real-world constitutional property regimes are 
often riddled with ambiguities. That is, constitutions often include strong 
procedural and substantive restrictions on the power of eminent domain but 
also include “fine print” that can undermine those restrictions. This Essay 
finds that when accounting for such fine print, constitutional restrictions on 
the power of eminent domain appear to be correlated with reduced 
expropriation risks. This finding suggests that the effectiveness of takings 
clauses might depend on the politics surrounding their adoption. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A long-standing consensus exists that arbitrary or excessive 
expropriation of private property by a country hurts its economic growth.1 
When private property is not secure, international investors avoid making 
 
1 One study shows that England, after the Glorious Revolution, improved long-term economic 
performance by credibly committing to property rights. See Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, 
Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-
Century England, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 803 (1989). Since then, numerous cross-country studies have 
shown that a robust connection exists between secure property rights and long-run economic 
performance. See, e.g., Philip Keefer, Beyond Legal Origin and Checks and Balances: Political 
Credibility, Citizen Information and Financial Sector Development (World Bank Policy Research, 
Working Paper No. 4145, 2007); Philip Keefer & Stephen Knack, Polarization, Politics and Property 
Rights: Links Between Inequality and Growth, 111 PUB. CHOICE 127 (2002). For an overview of the 
literature, see Stephan Haggard et al., The Rule of Law and Economic Development, 11 ANN. REV. POL. 
SCI. 205, 207 (2008). Related economic literature has focused on the importance of “institutions” in 
ensuring economic growth but also tends to emphasize the importance of property rights protections. 
See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu et al., Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth, in 
1A HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 385 (Philippe Aghion & Steven N. Durlauf eds., 2005); Daron 
Acemoglu et al., The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation, 
5 AM. ECON. REV. 1369 (2001) [hereinafter Acemoglu et al., Colonial Origins].  
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long-term investments in the country.2 Likewise, citizens underinvest in 
property because, considering the risk of expropriation, they discount its 
future value.3 Indeed, economists have long emphasized the importance of 
secure private property rights as a crucial ingredient for economic growth.4 
In fact, one recent empirical study suggests protecting private property 
from government intervention is the single most important institutional 
predictor of economic growth.5 
Constitutional scholars have often suggested that constitutions can 
play an important role in protecting private property from arbitrary or 
excessive government expropriation.6 Constitutions contain various 
mechanisms that can restrict a government’s ability to deviate from the 
constitutions’ promises ex post. As a result, constitutions allow 
governments to credibly commit to respect private property and to signal to 
investors, capital markets, and individual citizens alike that their property is 
secure from expropriation. 
 
2 See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 51–52 (1990) (noting that secure property rights increase long-term investment because 
they reduce uncertainty and stabilize expectations); Janice E. Thomson & Stephen D. Krasner, Global 
Transactions and the Consolidation of Sovereignty, in GLOBAL CHANGES AND THEORETICAL 
CHALLENGES: APPROACHES TO WORLD POLITICS FOR THE 1990S, at 195, 214 (Ernst-Otto Czempiel & 
James N. Rosenau eds., 1989) (observing that “[w]ithout secure property rights market activities would 
be constrained because of uncertainty about the possessor’s right to sell the commodity and the threat to 
achieve transfers through force and coercion rather than voluntary exchange,” as a result of which 
“[c]apital allocation would be aimed at maximizing short term gain—getting out before the rules of the 
game were changed”). A body of literature demonstrates empirically that secure property rights 
encourage foreign direct investment. See, e.g., Glen Biglaiser & Karl DeRouen Jr., Economic Reforms 
and Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America, 41 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 51 (2006); Yi 
Feng, Political Freedom, Political Instability, and Policy Uncertainty: A Study of Political Institutions 
and Private Investment in Developing Countries, 45 INT’L STUD. Q. 271 (2001); Nathan Jensen, 
Political Risk, Democratic Institutions, and Foreign Direct Investment, 70 J. POL. 1040 (2008); Quan 
Li, Democracy, Autocracy, and Expropriation of Foreign Direct Investment, 42 COMP. POL. STUD. 
1098 (2009); Quan Li & Adam Resnick, Reversal of Fortunes: Democratic Institutions and Foreign 
Direct Investment Inflows to Developing Countries, 57 INT’L ORG. 175 (2003). 
3 See Eirik G. Furubotn & Svetozar Pejovich, Property Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey of 
Recent Literature, 10 J. ECON. LIT. 1137, 1139 (1972) (“It is not difficult to accept the basic idea that 
‘property rights’ tend to influence incentives and behavior.” (citation omitted)). 
4 See supra note 1. 
5 Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, Unbundling Institutions, 113 J. POL. ECON. 949, 953 (2005). 
6 North & Weingast, supra note 1, at 805–08 (suggesting that credible constitutional commitments 
to protect private property allow governments to access capital); see also Daniel A. Farber, Rights as 
Signals, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 88–89 (2002) (suggesting that constitutional commitments to respect 
private property can attract foreign direct investors); John Ferejohn & Lawrence Sager, Commitment 
and Constitutionalism, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1929, 1929 (2003) (describing constitutions as pre-commitment 
devices and noting that “[a] government that is constitutionally barred from expropriating property is 
thereby better able to attract capital”); David S. Law, Globalization and the Future of Constitutional 
Rights, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1277, 1309–10 (2008) (suggesting that countries can use their bill of rights, 
and especially their property rights protections, to compete for foreign investment).  
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Although constitutions can assist states in reaping the long-term 
economic benefits associated with secure property rights, remarkably little 
is known of how constitutions actually curb the power of eminent domain7 
or whether such restrictions are associated with reduced de facto 
expropriation risks. This Essay fills that gap by presenting original and 
fine-grained data on the procedural and substantive restrictions that the 
world’s constitutions have placed on the power of eminent domain from 
1946 to 2013.8 With this data, this Essay documents cross-country variation 
in takings clauses, including their development over time. It also provides 
an empirical exploration of the relationship between de jure constitutional 
restrictions on the power of eminent domain and de facto or real-world 
expropriation risks. Its core finding is that no observable relationship exists 
between de jure takings clauses and de facto government respect for private 
property. However, when accounting for the ambiguities built into the 
constitution’s design, stronger de jure restrictions on the power of eminent 
domain do appear to be correlated with reduced de facto expropriation 
risks. 
This Essay begins by articulating the conventional wisdom on why 
takings clauses are supposed to reduce de facto expropriation risks.9 It 
starts from the assumption that, for most states, the long-term economic 
benefits of restricting the power of eminent domain will outweigh the 
short-term gains of expropriation. Yet, a commitment to curb arbitrary or 
excessive expropriation will pay off only when it is perceived as credible 
by investors, capital markets, and private citizens. One way to make this 
commitment credible is to entrench it in a constitution that comes with a set 
of mechanisms that make it harder to renege on this commitment in the 
future. Constitutions make it harder to renege on commitments because 
they are difficult to amend, can be enforced by the judiciary, and generally 
come with a set of coordination benefits that make it hard to ignore the 
document altogether.10 In sum, the conventional wisdom purports to 
explain both why states adopt protective takings clauses and why they 
comply with them in practice. 
This Essay next suggests two explanations for why the conventional 
wisdom might not hold and why takings clauses might fail to constrain in 
practice. First, countries could enshrine disingenuous promises in their 
constitution to reap international benefits, such as improving their 
 
7 The most comprehensive (qualitative) comparative survey on takings clauses in a set of 
constitutions is provided by A.J. VAN DER WALT, CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY CLAUSES (1999). 
8 See infra Part II.A (introducing the data). 
9 See infra Part I. 
10 See infra Part I.A. 
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international reputation or attracting foreign aid.11 They may even attempt 
to attract investors based on such false promises. If so, we should expect 
takings clauses to fail when adopted in the absence of genuine constraints, 
and specifically, when there is no independent judiciary that can enforce 
the constitution’s restrictions on the power of eminent domain. The 
empirical analysis presented in this Essay lends no support for the thesis 
that the effectiveness of takings clauses depends on the presence of an 
independent judiciary. 
A second reason for why takings clauses might fail to constrain in 
practice is that a majority of citizens might believe that some degree of 
expropriation benefits them more than a strong protection of private 
property.12 When this is the case, the constitutional commitment to protect 
private property is not necessarily disingenuous but might be surrounded 
by substantial societal disagreements. How such societal disagreements 
will affect the takings clause’s future operation depends on the politics 
surrounding its adoption. When those who favor some degree of 
expropriation control the constitution-making process, it is likely that the 
constitution will simply enshrine fewer restrictions on the power of 
eminent domain. By contrast, when economic elites that benefit 
disproportionally from secure property rights control the constitution-
making process, these elites will adopt protective takings clauses that might 
subsequently be undermined by future democratic politics.13 A last 
possibility, explored at some length in this Essay, is that neither economic 
elites nor popular majorities control the process entirely. As a result, the 
competing interests of different societal groups will be built into the 
constitution’s design. Indeed, this Essay shows that real-world 
constitutional property regimes are riddled with ambiguities. Specifically, 
some constitutions not only include a number of procedural and substantive 
restrictions on the power of eminent domain in their takings clause, but also 
include “fine print” that is typically separated from the main takings clause 
but that nonetheless could be used to circumvent the guarantees in the main 
takings clause. Examples of “fine print” include provisions that offer a 
narrow definition of private property, policies that contemplate land 
reform, provisions that restrict the property rights of foreigners, and clauses 
that make private property subordinate to the common good. 
This Essay finds that when accounting for takings clauses’ “fine 
print,” that is, the ambiguities that are built into the constitution’s design, 
constitutional restrictions on the power of eminent domain do appear to be 
correlated with reduced de facto expropriation risks. In other words, only 
 
11 See infra Part I.B.1. 
12 See infra Part I.B.2. 
13 See infra Part I.B.2. 
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when the constitutional commitment to restrict the power of eminent 
domain is unambiguous, stronger restrictions on the eminent domain power 
are correlated with reduced expropriation risks. This finding suggests that 
the effectiveness of constitutional takings clauses is to an important extent 
determined by the politics surrounding their adoption. 
This Essay unfolds as follows. Part I articulates the conventional 
wisdom on why constitutional takings clauses matter as well as two reasons 
for why this wisdom might not hold in practice. Part II introduces the 
dataset on takings clauses, and documents cross-national variation in 
takings clauses, including how they have developed over time. Part III 
contrasts the de jure takings clauses with data on de facto expropriation 
risks. Part IV explores whether takings clauses matter under some 
circumstances only. Following the theories developed in Part I, Part IV 
primarily explores “false positives,” that is, states that adopt takings clauses 
either for entirely disingenuous reasons or in the face of substantial societal 
disagreements over the desired level of expropriation.14 It also provides a 
preliminary exploration of “false negatives,” that is, countries that respect 
private property de jure but do not restrict the power of eminent domain de 
facto.15 The core empirical finding from Parts III and IV is that takings 
clauses appear to have no impact in the aggregate but that they do appear to 
matter when the constitution unambiguously commits to protect private 
property and omits internal contradictions. Part IV concludes by describing 
the limitations of the findings presented in this Essay and suggests future 
directions for the comparative constitutional law literature. 
I. THE POLITICS OF TAKINGS CLAUSES: COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE 
A. The Conventional Wisdom 
It is widely accepted that protecting private property from arbitrary or 
excessive expropriation contributes to long-term economic growth.16 When 
private property is secure from expropriation, citizens make more 
productive use of their property, governments can more readily access 
capital on capital markets, and investors are more likely to invest in the 
country.17 Consequently, for most societies, the long-term economic 
 
14 I borrow this terminology from BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS 17–18 (2009). 
15 Id. Professors Law and Versteeg refer to false positives as “sham constitutions” and describe the 
false negatives as “modest constitutions.” See David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, 
101 CALIF. L. REV. 863 (2013) [hereinafter Law & Versteeg, Sham Constitutions]. 
16 See supra note 1. 
17 See supra note 2. 
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benefits that are associated with secure property rights will far outweigh the 
short-term gains of expropriation. 
Yet, the benefits associated with restrictions on the power of eminent 
domain will materialize only when the restrictions against arbitrary or 
excessive expropriation are credible.18 Capital markets, investors, and 
private citizens are likely well aware of a potential time-inconsistency 
problem that plagues government commitments to respect private property: 
though governments appreciate the benefits of secure property rights in 
theory, they might be tempted to renege on these promises once they are 
put in place.19 Expropriation will be appealing when the state is short on 
capital and the survival of the regime is at stake.20 In such times, politicians 
whose tenures depend on regular elections might discount the future value 
of property protection and attempt to reap the short-term benefits of 
expropriation even at the expense of long-term economic growth. Because 
of these incentives, economic actors will invest only when they trust that 
their investments will not be undermined by future government action.21 
Constitutions have long been regarded as devices that can make 
commitments credible.22 One of the fundamental goals of constitution-
making is to solve the time–inconsistency problem that plagues many 
government commitments. Constitutions are supposed to be the ropes that, 
in Homer’s parable, bind Ulysses to the mast so that he can resist the 
singing of the Sirens.23 Constitutional theorists have proposed various 
mechanisms that make it harder for a government to renege on its promises 
and thus make constitutional commitments credible.24 First, the constitution 
is the supreme authority of the legal system and is typically harder to 
amend than ordinary legislation.25 Second, the constitution’s rules and 
 
18 See, e.g., Farber, supra note 6, at 88–89. 
19 North & Weingast, supra note 1, at 806. 
20 Id. at 807 (noting that the incentives to renege on commitments to protect private property ex 
post are particularly large in times of crises, such as warfare, because at such times, the government is 
likely to discount the future, and thus the long-term benefits associated with constitutional reform). 
21 For example, as Professors North and Weingast showed in their study on seventeenth-century 
England, the British crown was able to reap long-term economic benefits associated with secure 
property rights only once it made its commitments credible by appointing Parliament as the key bearer 
of the crown’s treasure chest. Id. at 804. 
22 See generally JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND 
IRRATIONALITY (rev. ed. 1984) (likening constitutions to Ulysses ropes that help him to honor his 
earlier commitment to resist the singing of the Sirens).  
23 HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 144–48 (Samuel Butler trans., 1998) (narrating the story of Ulysses and 
the Sirens). 
24 ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 38 (2009).  
25 Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 355, 
360–65 (1994) (illustrating that constitutions are usually more difficult to amend than legislation); Mila 
Versteeg & Emily Zackin, American Constitutional Exceptionalism Revisited, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1641, 
1671–72 (2014) (describing amendment rates in the world’s constitutions and in state constitutions). 
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principles are commonly guarded by a judicial body equipped with the 
power to strike down laws and regulations that contradict these rules and 
principles.26 Third, the constitution helps a state to coordinate upon a set of 
conventions by which it governs itself and that become harder to change 
with time.27 The very act of writing a constitution sets conventions that 
clarify the rules by which different actors must play the political game. For 
example, the constitution stipulates how many branches of government 
there are, how they are elected and composed, and what they can and 
cannot do with their power. Even though political actors might not value a 
given constitutional rule, they do value the general notion of having rules, 
which facilitate better government coordination. Because having 
conventions is valuable in and of itself, it becomes harder to ignore the 
parts of the constitution that are perceived as less desirable because doing 
so would undermine the coordination benefits of the constitution as a 
whole.28 In sum, the constitution provides a range of mechanisms (such as 
entrenchment, judicial review, and coordination) that make it harder to 
deviate from those promises ex post, thereby serving as the metaphorical 
ropes that tie a nation to its commitments.29 
Unlike Ulysses’s ropes, however, the constitutional protection 
mechanisms are not fail-safe. A constitution can ultimately be amended, 
courts ignored, and the rules of the game can be recoordinated.30 Each of 
these, however, imposes substantial costs. Thus, even though a constitution 
does not make it impossible for a government to renege on its 
constitutional promises, it does raise the costs of doing so. 
The costs of reneging on constitutional commitments are likely lower 
when these commitments are countermajoritarian in nature. That is, when 
 
26 See Denis J. Galligan & Mila Versteeg, Theoretical Perspectives on the Social and Political 
Foundations of Constitutions, in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS 3, 20 
(Denis J. Galligan & Mila Versteeg eds., 2013). 
27 See RUSSELL HARDIN, LIBERALISM, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 82–85 (1999); 
Russell Hardin, Why a Constitution?, in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS 51, 
60 (Denis J. Galligan and Mila Versteeg eds., 2013) [hereinafter Hardin, Why] (noting it is “very 
difficult to organize what would have to be a de facto collective action to topple a going convention”); 
see also Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 
124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 659 (2011) (describing the coordination perspective); Kevin Cope & Mila 
Versteeg, Constitutions, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA FOR THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL 
SCIENCES (James Wright ed., 2015) (noting that government needs coordination, just like “competitive 
rowers, who must row in-sync to move the boat efficiently, or to automobile drivers, who must all drive 
on the right (or left) to avoid logjam or collision”). 
28 Hardin, Why, supra note 28, at 60.  
29 Levinson, supra note 28, at 673–75 (“An oft-cited benefit of constitutionalism is that it enables 
us to commit to normatively preferred policies in order to stand firm during moments when pathological 
politics might undermine these policies.”). 
30 See id., at 682–83 (suggesting that many social science theories on precommitment do not 
actually explain why constitutional constraints endure in the future). 
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constitutional commitments serve to protect minority interests against the 
majority, majorities can fairly easily amend the constitution, appoint 
sympathetic judges to the court, or use their political clout in some other 
way to change the rules of the political game. Indeed, these scenarios were 
precisely James Madison’s concern when he described the bill of rights as 
nothing but “parchment barriers.”31 According to Madison, constitutions 
can prevent the problem of “faction,” that is, minorities taking advantage of 
the majority.32 But Madison was more pessimistic about constitutions’ 
abilities to systematically protect minorities from majority rule.33 He feared 
that when the majority wants to violate the minority’s rights, the 
metaphorical ropes that tie a state to its earlier commitments would be 
unbound.34 Of course, it does not necessarily follow that 
countermajoritarian constitutional constraints are meaningless altogether. 
Even countermajoritarian constraints raise the costs of noncompliance.35 As 
Professor Hardin argues, people acquiesce even to unpopular constitutional 
rules because they value having a set of conventions to conduct their 
political affairs, and because coordinating upon an alternative set of rules is 
costly.36  
In general, however, it will be more difficult to renege on 
constitutional commitments that enjoy majority support. Although those in 
power might at times be tempted to subvert the majority’s wishes, if these 
wishes are enshrined in the constitution, then a number of constitutional 
mechanisms might make it near-impossible to do so in fact. Courts are 
likely staffed with judges who support the constitution’s protections, and 
court decisions can act as “fire alarms” that set off political mobilization.37 
Moreover, where constitutional commitments are majoritarian in nature, 
proposed constitutional amendments will be voted down, and attempts to 
 
31 THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 221 (James Madison) (Jim Manis ed., 2014). 
32 Id. NO. 10, at 43–44 (James Madison). 
33 Levinson, supra note 28, at 667 (noting that the bill of rights as originally conceived was “meant 
not to protect against majoritarian tyranny . . . but, quite the opposite, to bolster majoritarian governance 
by limiting the self-serving behavior of federal officials . . . ”). 
34 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in DECLARING RIGHTS 160, 
161 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1998) [hereinafter Madison Letter] (noting that “experience proves the 
inefficacy of a bill of rights on those occasions when its control is most needed” and “[r]epeated 
violations of these parchment barriers have been committed by overbearing majorities in every State”). 
35 For an extended discussion, see Levinson, supra note 28. 
36 Hardin, Why, supra note 28, at 60 (noting that even hated conventions are difficult to change, 
and citing the potentially destabilizing nature of the American Electoral College, which remains 
unchanged after the 2000 election). Madison, by contrast, ultimately came to believe that 
countermajoritarian rights could work if the structural part of the constitution successfully induces 
competition between different factions. See Levinson, supra note 28, at 668. 
37 Ran Hirschl, The Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment Through Constitutionalization: 
Lessons from Four Constitutional Revolutions, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 91, 100 (2000). 
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undermine the constitutional order will induce political opposition.38 Thus, 
when constitutional constraints enjoy popular support, these constraints are 
at their strongest. 
Whether constitutional takings clauses are majoritarian in nature, and 
are therefore most likely to remain effective over time, is a difficult 
question. On the one hand, takings clauses could be seen as majoritarian 
because they contribute to long-term economic growth, which benefits the 
nation as a whole. Indeed, economists have shown that a lack of secure 
property rights substantially hampers a country’s economic development.39 
Conversely, constitutional restrictions on the power of eminent domain 
improve economic growth and therefore can make the country as a whole 
better off.40 One way to view property clauses, therefore, is as majoritarian 
in nature. On this view, we would expect that constitutional protections 
against expropriation are particularly effective in constraining future 
government action. On the other hand, viewing takings clauses as 
majoritarian is also problematic because, in most societies, property is 
unequally distributed, and a majority of people might believe that they 
benefit more from expropriation than from the increased economic growth 
associated with secure property rights. In that case, constitutional 
protections against expropriation are likely to be undermined by democratic 
politics, and will fail in practice. The next Part will explore in more detail 
how the countermajoritarian characteristics of takings clauses might 
undermine these clauses’ operation. 
B. Revisiting the Conventional Wisdom: Disingenuous  
and Halfhearted Promises 
There are at least two scenarios under which takings clauses fail to 
protect private property in practice. First, states might adopt takings clauses 
in bad faith, making the procedural and substantive restrictions ostensibly 
placed on the power of eminent domain mere deceptions. Second, states 
might adopt takings clauses when they are only partially committed to 
protect private property because different groups stand divided over the 
extent to which the power of eminent domain ought to be curbed. In both 
scenarios, the conventional wisdom would likely not hold, and the level of 
de jure takings protections can be stronger on paper than in practice. 
1. Disingenuous Promises.—One reason why restrictions on the 
power of eminent domain could be stronger on paper than in practice is that 
 
38 See Madison Letter, supra note 35, at 162 (describing rights “as a standard for trying the validity 
of public acts, and a signal for rousing [and] uniting the superior force of the community”). 
39 See supra note 1. 
40 Id. 
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some countries enshrine disingenuous promises into their constitutions. The 
constitution of North Korea, for example, states that “[t]he State shall 
protect private property and guarantee its legal inheritance.”41 In practice, 
however, all property belongs to the state and people enjoy no private 
property protections at all.42 
Disingenuous promises emerge when regimes want to avoid subjecting 
themselves to any genuine constitutional constraints. For authoritarian 
regimes, the benefits of evading constitutional constraints often outweigh 
the economic benefits of protective takings clauses.43 Authoritarian rules, 
after all, do not necessarily seek to maximize general welfare, but rather 
seek to secure their own grip on power.44 Such regimes can either avoid 
making any constitutional promises at all or adopt false constitutional 
promises.45 There are a number of reasons why they might choose the 
latter. First, they could do so simply to bolster their international 
reputation.46 A body of sociological literature has demonstrated that the 
international community is increasingly characterized by standardized 
scripts of statehood, including standardized constitutional templates that 
protect democracy, liberal values, and property rights.47 A formal 
constitution that includes the values and principles enshrined in this 
standardized script has become a sign of modernity and a ticket for the 
entry into “world society.”48 By adopting such a constitution, states signal 
conformity to the values of world society, and can improve their standing 
 
41 JOSEON MINJUJUUI INMIN GONGHWAGUK SAHOEJUUI HEONBEOP [CONSTITUTION] (2012), art. 
24 (N. Kor.). 
42 See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 10 Reasons Countries Fall Apart, FOREIGN 
POL’Y (June. 18, 2012), available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/06/18/10-reasons-countries-fall-
apart/ [http://perma.cc/832S-A8DT] (observing that “North Korea’s economic institutions make it 
almost impossible for people to own property; the state owns everything, including nearly all land and 
capital”). 
43 But see TAMIR MOUSTAFA, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 77–78, 229 (2007) 
(describing how the Sadat regime in Egypt subjected itself to genuine constraints on the power of 
eminent domain in order to attract foreign direct investment).  
44 See Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser, Introduction: Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes, in 
CONSTITUTIONS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 1, 5–6 (Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser eds., 2014) 
(noting authoritarian constitutions often are used to facilitate elite coordination and cohesion). 
45 David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, Constitutional Variation Among Strains of Authoritarianism, in 
CONSTITUTIONS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 165, 165–66 (Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser eds., 
2014) [hereinafter Law & Versteeg, Constitutional Variation] (suggesting that authoritarian 
constitutions can either be brutally honest or sham). 
46 Ginsburg & Simpser, supra note 45, at 6 (noting that constitutions in authoritarian regimes often 
serve as “billboards” that display an attractive picture to the world). 
47 John W. Meyer et al., World Society and the Nation-State, 103 AM. J. SOC. 144, 144–45 (1997) 
(“Many features of the contemporary nation-state derive from worldwide models constructed and 
propagated through global cultural and associational processes.”).  
48 See id., at 159.  
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in the international community.49 Thus, by conforming to international 
norms against expropriation, states might reap benefits associated with an 
improved international reputation. 
A second reason why states might adopt facade takings clauses is to 
attract bilateral and multilateral aid flows.50 Indeed, both foreign aid donors 
and international financial institutions have often made their assistance 
conditional upon respect for human rights, including property rights.51 Aid 
donors, moreover, have offered technical assistance for rule-of-law reforms 
that include protective property regimes.52 In both cases, the involvement of 
aid donors might prompt drafters, acting in bad faith, to adopt protective 
takings clauses to reap the benefits offered. 
Finally, states could feature facade restrictions on the power of 
eminent domain with the intent of luring foreign investors, only to later 
expropriate the invested property. Foreign investment is characterized by 
the so-called obsolescing bargain, which holds that investors are in a 
dominant position ex ante when they are deciding on where to invest, but 
that they lose this advantage after they have made their investment.53 
Therefore, if ill-intending states are able to attract investors with false 
promises, these states will be in a strong position to expropriate them 
afterwards. Of course, international investors are unlikely to be fooled so 
easily. Investors devote substantial time and resources to assessing whether 
their investments are secure, and they are likely to know when 
governments are not genuinely committed to protecting private property. 
But where promises are cheap, constitution-makers might consider it worth 
a try. 
 
49 Law & Versteeg, Constitutional Variation, supra note 46, at 170–71 (noting that authoritarian 
regime might write liberal constitutions to gain acceptance from the international community); see also 
B.S. Chimni, International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making, 15 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 1, 15 (2004); Julian Go, A Globalizing Constitutionalism? Views from the Postcolony, 1945–
2000, 18 INT’L SOC. 71, 90 (2003); Meyer et al., supra note 48, at 153. 
50 Benedikt Goderis & Mila Versteeg, The Diffusion of Constitutional Rights, 39 INT’L REV. L. & 
ECON. 1, 14 (2014) (finding empirically that countries that share common aid donors end up with 
similar constitutional arrangements, and attributing this finding to pressure from the aid donors). 
51 In the United States, for example, federal law prohibits the allocation of security assistance to 
nations that engage in “gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.” See 22 U.S.C. 
§ 2304(a)(2) (2012); see also Alberto Alesina & David Dollar, Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and 
Why?, 5 J. ECON. GROWTH 33, 33–34 (2000); Eric Neumayer, Is Respect for Human Rights Rewarded? 
An Analysis of Total Bilateral and Multilateral Aid Flows, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 510, 526–27 (2003). 
52 RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 47 (2004). 
53 RAYMOND VERNON, IN THE HURRICANE’S EYE: THE TROUBLED PROSPECTS OF MULTINATIONAL 
ENTERPRISES 65 (1998) (drawing attention to the “obsolescing bargain,” which holds that investors are 
in a dominant position ex ante, at the time host countries are persuading them to invest, but that they 
lose this advantage ex post, and will therefore be cautious on when to invest). 
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False promises can be detected by a conspicuous absence of real 
enforcement mechanisms.54 Accepting genuine constraints on the power of 
eminent domain can be a dangerous strategy for regimes that seek to 
govern without constraints. When doing so, they risk reducing their grip on 
power because the constitutional mechanisms that curb eminent domain 
could be turned against them in other areas as well. For example, when the 
Sadat regime in Egypt made a conscious effort to attract foreign investment 
by adopting a strong takings clause and establishing an independent 
constitutional court to enforce it, the government was later forced to accept 
court rulings that protected individual rights,55 leading one commentator to 
describe the Egyptian constitution as “a joke that turned serious.”56 For 
those who want to govern without constraints, the more plausible strategy, 
therefore, might be to adopt constitutions that promise rights, including 
property rights, but do not offer any mechanisms to enforce these rights 
against the government.57 
Perhaps the most important mechanism for enforcing the constitution’s 
restrictions on the power of eminent domain is an independent judiciary 
with the power of constitutional review.58 Courts can strike down laws that 
expropriate excessively, and they can act as a neutral arbiter in property 
disputes between the government and private parties.59 Investors have long 
 
54 See supra Part I.A. 
55 Tamir Moustafa, Law and Resistance in Authoritarian States: The Judicialization of Politics in 
Egypt, in RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 132, 136–39 (Tom 
Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., 2008) [hereinafter Moustafa, Law and Resistance]. 
56 Mona El-Ghobashy, Constitutional Contention in Contemporary Egypt, 51 AM. BEHAV. 
SCIENTIST 1590, 1598 (2008). 
57 Walter F. Murphy, Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and Democracy, in CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 3, 8 (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds., 
1993) (characterizing constitutions that exist for “cosmetic” purposes as “sham” constitutions, and 
observing that “[t]he principal function of a sham constitutional text is to deceive”); A.E. Dick Howard, 
A Traveler from an Antique Land: The Modern Renaissance of Comparative Constitutionalism, 50 VA. 
J. INT’L L. 3, 13 (2009) (dubbing the Soviet constitution of 1936 “a Potemkin Village, its provisions 
meaning whatever the Party chose for them to mean”). See generally Law & Versteeg, Sham 
Constitutions, supra note 16 (documenting constitutional noncompliance globally over the last three 
decades). 
58 Farber, supra note 6, at 87 (noting that judicial independence “suggests that the judiciary has the 
necessary strength to enforce constitutional prohibitions against expropriation”); see also Stefan Voigt 
& Jerg Gutmann, Turning Cheap Talk into Economic Growth: On the Relationship Between Property 
Rights and Judicial Independence, 41 J. COMP. ECON. 66, 68 (2013) (“[A] factually independent 
judiciary increases the credibility of government promises, including the promise to enforce property 
rights.”); James Melton, Credibly Committing to Property Rights: The Roles of Reputation, Institutions, 
and the Constitution 26 (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctqjm0/Files/
melton_propertyrights.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZC5B-8GFF] (“[W]ithout a fair, efficient, and independent 
judiciary that is constitutionally guaranteed, economic actors cannot be sure that their property is 
safe.”). 
59 Daniel M. Klerman & Paul G. Mahoney, The Value of Judicial Independence: Evidence from 
Eighteenth Century England, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 6 (2005). 
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accepted the notion that an independent judiciary is crucial for the 
protection of property rights from government expropriation. As one study 
from the 1970s notes: 
The presence of a strong, independent, and competent judiciary can be 
interpreted as an indicator of a low propensity to expropriate. If this judicial 
system is strong, independent, and competent, it will be less likely to ‘rubber 
stamp’ the legality of an expropriation and more likely to accede to a standard 
of fair compensation. The effect of this would be to lower the propensity of 
the host nation government to expropriate.60 
This insight suggests that when states adopt constitutional takings 
clauses in the absence of an independent judiciary that can enforce these 
clauses, their commitment to protect private property might be 
disingenuous. Thus, in countries that purport to constitutionally restrict the 
power of eminent domain, the absence of an independent judiciary is a red 
flag.61 
2. Halfhearted Promises: Faction and Disagreement.—Another 
possible explanation for why eminent domain restrictions might be stronger 
on paper than in practice is that the restrictions enjoy only partial popular 
support. That is, the promise to respect private property is not entirely 
disingenuous, but it lacks support from important segments of society. 
Although curbing the power of eminent domain can make society as a 
whole better off, takings clauses are hardly majoritarian when the benefits 
of constitutional restrictions on eminent domain fall disproportionally upon 
economic elites. In general, restrictions on the power of eminent domain 
disproportionally benefit those who possess more property. Moreover, 
these same economic elites might also receive a disproportionate share of 
the increased economic welfare flowing from secure property rights. When 
wealth is unequally distributed, a majority of citizens might benefit more 
from expropriation than from the long-term economic benefits associated 
with secure property rights. For the bottom part of the income earners, 
expropriation will be appealing when they expect that only a small part of 
the future gains will come their way, because they discount the future, or 
both. Regardless of their exact motivations, competing preferences for the 
desired level of property protection likely affect the operation of the takings 
clause in practice. 
 
60 MOUSTAFA, supra note 44, at 69 (quoting J. FREDERICK TRUITT, EXPROPRIATION OF PRIVATE 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT 44–45 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
61 Another red flag might be authoritarianism as such, yet authoritarian leaders do sometimes 
credibly commit to private property, as the Egyptian case suggest. The focus of the empirical analysis in 
Parts III and IV will therefore be on judicial independence, while controlling for democracy. See also 
note 133 supra for a further discussion of the possible impact of democracy.  
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How different preferences for restricting eminent domain affect the 
takings clause’s operation likely depends on the circumstances surrounding 
its adoption. Where democratic majorities with a preference for some 
degree of expropriation dominate the constitution-making process, the 
constitution might simply enshrine fewer restrictions on the power of 
eminent domain. To illustrate, the drafters of the 1983 Canadian Charter 
decided to omit a takings clause altogether for fear of replicating the 
American Lochner experience.62 Indeed, there exists substantial cross-
country variation in the strength of the restrictions placed on the power of 
eminent domain.63 These constitutional differences presumably reflect how 
different constitution-makers balance the importance of private property 
against other values. Thus, where a portion of the population favors 
restricting the power of eminent domain, and this group is influential in the 
constitution-making process, the constitution will simply enshrine fewer de 
jure restrictions on the power of eminent domain.  
By contrast, when the constitution-making process is dominated by 
economic elites who value secure property rights more than popular 
majorities do, this might result in a situation in which restrictions on the 
power of eminent domain are stronger on paper than in practice. According 
to a body of literature, constitutions often serve as tools for elites to 
insulate their policy preferences from future democratic decisionmaking.64 
Professor Hirschl has found that economic elites who anticipate losing 
power will constitutionally entrench strong property rights to protect their 
property from future expropriation by democratic majorities.65 Likewise, 
historian Charles Beard has famously argued that the desire to preserve 
wealth and privilege was the guiding rationale behind the U.S. 
Constitution, which, he says, largely protected the economic interests of the 
wealthy.66 
 
62 Sujit Choudhry, The Lochner Era and Comparative Constitutionalism, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 1, 3–
5 (2004) (suggesting that the Canadians wanted to avoid the American Lochner experience, whereby 
“the U.S. Supreme Court struck down close to two hundred state and federal laws” that infringed upon 
economic freedom and private contract). 
63 See infra Part II.  
64 For an overview of this literature, see Ran Hirschl, The Strategic Foundations of Constitutions, 
in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS 157, 169 (Denis Galligan & Mila 
Versteeg eds., 2013) [hereinafter Hirschl, Strategic Foundations]. 
65 See generally HIRSCHL, supra note 53, at 49 (observing that “[e]conomic elites may therefore 
view the constitutionalization of rights, especially property, mobility, and occupational rights, as a 
means of . . . fighting what their members often perceive to be harmful large-government policies of an 
encroaching state”).  
66 CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 164, 303 (Transaction Publishers 1998) (1913) (arguing that the “real nature” of the fight over 
the ratification of the Constitution was between the “natural aristocracy” and common people 
representing “turbulent democracy” and that “the protection of property rights lay at the basis of the 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
710 
If a constitution disproportionally reflects the interests of economic 
elites, its restrictions on eminent domain are unlikely to align with 
majoritarian preferences. As a result, the various mechanisms designed to 
keep a government to its constitutional promises might break down. 
Democratic majorities can use their political clout to undermine the takings 
clause in different ways.67 To illustrate, in the United States, President 
Roosevelt’s court-packing plan forced the Court to adhere more closely to 
democratic preferences on property protection.68 Likewise, the Indian 
Supreme Court backed down from protecting property against social 
welfare legislation after a two-decade long battle with the Indian legislature 
in which the Indian legislature kept passing constitutional amendments to 
overturn Supreme Court decisions.69 Where such ideological shifts take 
place, the country will either move to a lower level of property protection 
de jure (through amending the constitution) or offer stronger property 
protections on paper than in practice. 
Another possibility is that neither popular majorities nor elites 
dominate the constitution-making process entirely and that the competing 
preferences of different groups are built into the constitution’s design. That 
is, the constitution simultaneously reflects both the values of economic 
elites that favor strong restrictions on eminent domain and those of popular 
majorities that want to carve out exceptions to these restrictions. The 
resulting constitution has built-in contradictions and ambiguities that allow 
it to be interpreted different ways, depending on how the political 
landscape changes after the constitution is ratified. 
The use of contradictory provisions, or strategic ambiguities, has been 
documented in different areas of constitutional law. Professors Bali and 
Lerner document this phenomenon with respect to religion: Constitution-
makers enshrine contradictory religion clauses when different religious 
 
new system”). But see FORREST MCDONALD, WE THE PEOPLE: THE ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 398 (Transaction Publishers 1992) (1958) (arguing that those economically affected by 
the Constitution had a wide variety competing interests and so “[i]t is therefore not even theoretically 
possible to devise a single set of alignments on the issue of ratification that would explain the contest as 
one in which economic self-interest was the principal motivating force”). 
67 Majorities may push for constitutional amendments and reduce de jure takings protections. In 
that case, however, we should not expect a disconnect between de jure and de facto property 
protections. 
68 MARIAN C. MCKENNA, FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND THE GREAT CONSTITUTIONAL WAR: THE 
COURT-PACKING CRISIS OF 1937, at 419–22 (2002); James W. Ely, Jr., Property Rights and Democracy 
in the American Constitutional Order, in THE JUDICIAL BRANCH 487, 506 (Kermit L. Hall & Kevin T. 
McGuire eds. 2005) (describing President Roosevelt’s court packing plan and noting that “this change 
of direction had a profound impact on the judicial protection of property rights. The Supreme Court 
now deferred to legislative judgments about economic policy and largely abandoned its historical 
dedication to the sanctity of private property and contractual arrangements”). 
69 For an overview, see VAN DER WALT, supra note 7, at 192–206. 
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groups stand divided over the appropriate role for religion in society.70 
They note that “[p]articularly in cases where the constitutional status of 
religious law was an important axis of debate, the outcome documents 
frequently embraced two approaches often considered to be mutually 
exclusive in the comparative constitutional literature.”71 In a recent study, 
Professor Negretto documents a similar phenomenon for electoral rules in 
Latin American constitutions.72 He notes that, as the democratic coalitions 
that write and revise constitutions have become more inclusive, 
constitutions have witnessed the adoption of electoral rules that improve 
the democratic responsiveness of government officials.73 At the same time, 
dominant groups within these coalitions have often been able to use their 
power to expand executive power, resulting in contradictory constitutional 
designs that simultaneously enhance democratic responsiveness and expand 
executive power.74 
In the same vein, Professor Lombardi has suggested that constitutions 
can incorporate strategic ambiguities to accommodate the competing 
ideologies of different societal groups in a single document.75 Lombardi 
illustrates his claim in the context of the 1971 Egyptian Constitution, which 
contained religious, libertarian, and authoritarian provisions that were in 
direct tension with each other and that reflected the diverging values and 
interests of competing groups. Lombardi observes that the constitution 
“reflected considerable confusion about the nature of the state and the 
ideology of its governing institutions,” allowing one to imagine the state in 
radically different ways: Pan-Arabist or Egyptian Nationalist, socialist or 
capitalist, and secular or Islamic.76 These ambiguities made it possible for 
warring factions to reach consensus because each faction believed that the 
constitution could protect their ideology if they were to hold power in the 
 
70 Asli Bali & Hanna Lerner, Religion in Constitution-Writing: A Theoretical Framework (2014) 
(unpublished draft) (on file with authors). See also HANNA LERNER, MAKING CONSTITUTIONS IN 
DEEPLY DIVIDED SOCIETIES 7 (2013) (describing “incrementalism” as a constitutional design strategy 
for religiously divided societies, which includes the use of “ambiguous legal language” and “inserting 
internally contradictory provisions in the constitution”).  
71 Id. at 5. 
72 GABRIEL L. NEGRETTO, MAKING CONSTITUTIONS: PRESIDENTS, PARTIES, AND INSTITUTIONAL 
CHOICE IN LATIN AMERICA 43–69 (2013). 
73 Id. at 9. 
74 Id. at 2. 
75 Clark B. Lombardi, The Constitution as an Agreement to Agree: The Social and Political 
Foundations (and Effects) of the 1971 Egyptian Constitution, in THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS 398, 398–99, 426 (Denis J. Galligan & Mila Versteeg eds., 2013). 
76 Id. at 398. 
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future.77 Indeed, the observation that societal disagreements might render 
constitutions internally inconsistent traces back at least to Carl Schmitt’s 
notion of the dilatorischer Formelkompromiss (“disingenuous 
compromise”), which produces a constitution that, in Schmitt’s words, 
“satisfies all contradictory demands and leaves, in an ambiguous turn of 
phrase, the actual points of controversy undecided,” and therefore provides 
nothing but a “semantic jumble of substantively irreconcilable matters.”78 
It is perhaps no surprise, then, that the politics surrounding private 
property render constitutional property regimes similarly ambiguous. As 
subsequent parts of this Essay elaborate, constitutions are often riddled 
with contradictions when it comes to property protections. To illustrate, 
several constitutions establish a very narrow meaning of “private property” 
that the nominally robust takings clause protects.79 Other constitutions 
enshrine a strong takings clause in the bill of rights, but include a separate 
section on state policies, which curtails property rights in the name of land 
reform or urban planning.80 Still others make sweeping claims that private 
property should serve a social purpose, or they subject foreign citizens to 
different property rights regimes.81 In many cases, these contrary provisions 
are not enshrined in the bill of rights but in various other parts of the 
constitution, such as a section on government policies or general 
principles.82 And perhaps even more surprisingly, these contrary provisions 
are found especially in constitutions that place strong restrictions on the 
power of eminent domain in their main takings clause. In other words, the 
 
77 See id.; see also Rosalind Dixon & Tom Ginsburg, Deciding Not to Decide: Deferral in 
Constitutional Design, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 636, 650 (2011) (offering a related account of why 
constitution-makers often defer decisions on contested issues through the use of “by law” clauses). 
78 CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 84–85 (Jeffrey Seitzer trans., Duke Univ. Press 
2008) (1928). I thank Ulrich Pruess for pointing me to Carl Schmitt on this point. 
79 See, e.g., LA CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CUBA [CONSTITUTION] Feb. 24, 1976, art. 22. 
(“The personal ownership of earnings and savings derived from one’s own work, of the dwelling which 
one possess with legal title of and of the other goods and objects which serve to satisfy the material and 
cultural needs of the person, is guaranteed.”). 
80 For example, although article 5 of the Brazilian Constitution guarantees everyone the right to 
property and requires that “the law shall establish procedures for expropriation for public necessity or 
public use, or for social interest, upon just and prior compensation in cash,” article 182 of the same 
states that “[u]rban property performs its social function when it conforms to the fundamental 
requirements for the city’s ordering expressed in the master plan.” CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] 
[CONSTITUTION] arts. 5, 182 (Braz.). 
81 See, e.g., LA CONSTITUTION DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE D’HAÏTI [CONSTITUTION] May 9, 2011 & June 
19, 2012, arts. 55, 55.1 (Haiti) (“The right to own real property is accorded to aliens resident in Haiti for 
the needs of their sojourn in the country. . . . However, aliens residing in Haiti may not own more than 
one dwelling in the same Arrondissement. They may in no case engage in the business of renting real 
estate.”). 
82 See, e.g., CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE EL SALVADOR [CONSTITUTION] Dec. 
20, 1983, arts. 22, 105 (El Sal.). 
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stronger the protections in the main takings clause, the higher the 
probability that contrary provisions will appear in other parts of the 
constitution.83 These contrary provisions thus act as fine print that should 
alert the careful reader that different parts of society were unable to agree 
on the desired level of property protection. 
Where such ambiguities are built into the constitution’s design, the 
constitution sends a mixed message: it both promises not to expropriate 
while including provisions to undermine the same. How these contrary 
provisions will affect the operation of the takings clause in practice likely 
depends on future political coalitions and their preferences. Where 
majorities prevail, and they benefit insufficiently from the economic 
benefits associated with secure property rights, it is likely that the fine print 
provisions will swallow the protections enshrined in the main takings 
clause. By contrast, where elites govern or majorities do value the long-
term economic benefits associated with secure property rights, the 
restrictions will prevail over the exceptions. Although both are plausible in 
theory, the empirical findings in the next Part of this Essay demonstrate 
that in the face of constitutional contradictions, the exceptions become the 
rule.84 
II. TAKINGS CLAUSES IN THE WORLD’S CONSTITUTIONS 
Takings clauses have become a near-universal ingredient of the 
world’s constitutions. Today, no less than 94% of all constitutions include a 
takings clause.85 Constitutional takings clauses do not prohibit 
expropriation altogether, but rather define and limit the circumstances 
under which a government can expropriate, thereby reducing the 
arbitrariness of expropriation. Substantial variation exists in the kind and 
number of restrictions that are placed on the power of eminent domain. 
Specifically, takings clauses differ from each other in the amount of 
compensation they require, when compensation ought to be paid, the 
circumstances under which expropriation is allowed, and the procedural 
guarantees that must be followed. Such differences presumably reflect 
differences in the composition and preferences of constitution-makers in 
different countries. 86 As a result of these differences, some constitutions 
 
83 See infra Part II.B. 
84 See infra Part IV.A.2. 
85 See infra Part II.A (introducing the data). 
86 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN, at 
ix (1985) (noting that social welfare requires some limitations on private property because “the claims 
of individual autonomy must be tempered by the frictions that pervade everyday life . . . . Autonomy 
must be protected by supplying an equivalent of what is lost, but it is not protected absolutely”). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
714 
ultimately provide stronger protections against expropriation than others. 
The remainder of this Part will explore and document this variation. 
A. Variation in Takings Clauses 
The empirical exploration of constitutional takings clauses is made 
possible by an original dataset on property protections in national 
constitutions from 1946 to 2013. This data was collected as part of a larger 
database on the world’s constitutions. Specifically, for each constitution 
written since 1946, the author hand-coded 237 variables that capture rights, 
rights-related policies, and their enforcement. The database takes account 
of the amendment and replacement of constitutions, thus tracking changes 
in the prevalence of these 237 constitutional features over time. This 
general dataset contains seventeen variables relating to constitutional 
property rights, which are used in this paper.87 The coding of national 
constitutions, of course, requires a range of decisions on what constitutes a 
constitution, as well as a range of decisions on how to code each 
constitution. The coding protocol for the database is documented in greater 
detail in the author’s earlier work.88 
A potential shortcoming of this data is that it only captures the text of 
the constitution and excludes judicial interpretations of the text. In theory, 
some of the substantive and procedural restrictions on the power of eminent 
domain that help nations credibly commit to respect private property might 
be found in judicial interpretations, rather than in the text of the 
constitution itself. Most countries, however, set out their constitutional 
property regime in great detail.89 One likely motivation for doing so is to 
limit judicial discretion in interpreting such provisions. Another motivation 
is that explicit constitutional protections send a stronger and clearer signal 
to foreign investors that their property is protected.90 Although investors 
could potentially consult judicial decisions, these are less visible, less 
accessible, and more easily overturned. As a result, we may expect that, in 
most cases, the explicit textual limitations on the eminent domain power 
are a fairly accurate representation of the constitutional limitations on 
expropriation. The remainder of this Part will explore the various explicit 
constitutional restrictions that states have placed on the power of eminent 
domain. 
 
87 The 1946–2006 portion of the data was collected as part of the author’s dissertation. The 2006–
2013 portion of the data was collected with the excellent assistance of Sean Roberts at the University of 
Virginia School of Law. 
88 See Law & Versteeg, Constitutional Variation, supra note 46. 
89 Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 26, at 1703 (noting that foreign constitutions are generally more 
detailed than the U.S. Constitution).  
90 See, e.g., Farber, supra note 6, at 88–91. 
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B. Compensation Requirement 
A substantial portion of the world’s constitutions require the 
government to compensate expropriated property. What constitutes the 
optimal level of compensation for expropriation is the subject of a 
voluminous literature in law and economics.91 The basic premise of this 
literature is that if the required level of compensation is too low, the 
government will expropriate more than is socially optimal, and if the level 
of compensation is too high, the government will expropriate less than 
what is socially optimal. The extensive literature notwithstanding, there 
appears to be little scholarly consensus on the optimal level of 
compensation.92 Also the world’s constitutions vary in the amount of 
compensation they demand. Some takings clauses do not require any 
compensation at all,93 while others require the government to pay 
compensation but do not specify how much compensation ought to be 
paid.94 Takings clauses that do specify the level of compensation roughly 
fall into two categories: (1) those that explicitly require either “full 
compensation” or “market value” compensation, and (2) those that use 
more ambiguous language such as “fair,” “adequate,” or “equitable” 
compensation.  
The drafting of the 1994 South African interim constitution illustrates 
the stakes of this choice. In the negotiations over the takings clause, the 
National Party that had governed the country under apartheid wanted to 
enshrine a requirement of full market value compensation in the takings 
clause, to protect the property interest of their wealthy constituents. By 
contrast, the African National Party, representing the majority of blacks 
that had suffered repression under the apartheid regime, wanted the takings 
 
91 YUN-CHIEN CHANG, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND TAKINGS COMPENSATION: THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 3–13 (2013) (discussing different types of compensation 
schemes advocated in literature, such as zero compensation, current value compensation, fair market 
value compensation, economic value compensation, and project value compensation).  
92 Some scholars propose lower, even zero, compensation as optimal. See, e.g., Lawrence Blume & 
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 569 (1984); 
Lawrence Blume, Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Perry Shapiro, The Taking of Land: When Should 
Compensation Be Paid?, 99 Q.J. ECON. 71 (1984). Others argue for a fuller compensation. See, e.g., 
Thomas J. Miceli, Compensation for the Taking of Land Under Eminent Domain, 147 J. INST. & 
THEOR. ECON. 354 (1991); Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Regulatory Takings: When Should 
Compensation Be Paid?, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 749 (1994). 
93 See QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC 
OF IRAN] 1358 [1980], art. 22. 
94 See Art. 42 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.). 
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clause to merely require “equitable” compensation, presumably to ease the 
redistribution of wealth to their constituents in the future.95 
Figure 1 depicts the prevalence of each of these options. It shows that 
the majority of constitutions demand compensation, but use ambiguous 
language on how much compensation is required. As of 2013, 62.7% of all 
constitutions with a takings clause opt for this approach. The number of 
constitutions that unambiguously require full or market value compensation 
is much lower, although they have been increasing in number since the 
1990s. Today, 15.3% of all constitutions with a takings clause require full 
or market value compensation. 
FIGURE 1: LEVEL OF COMPENSATION REQUIRED BY CONSTITUTION 
 
C. Timeliness of Compensation 
Takings clauses not only differ in how much compensation they 
require, but also differ in when they require compensation to be paid. 
Specifically, among the takings clauses that demand compensation, 
constitution-makers have opted for various approaches: (1) some require 
compensation to be paid prior to expropriation, (2) some require 
compensation to be paid promptly or within reasonable time after 
expropriation, and (3) some do not impose a timeliness requirement at all. 
Presumably, constitution-makers that add language requiring prior 
compensation favor stronger protection of property rights than those who 
 
95 Rosalind Dixon, Partial Constitutional Codes 10 (UNSW Law Research Paper No. 2014-37), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2482377 [http://perma.cc/L3FL-
DZPV]. 
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require prompt compensation or omit a timeliness requirement altogether. 
Figure 2 depicts the prevalence of each of these three options among 
the constitutions that stipulate a compensation requirement. It reveals that 
most constitutions do not include a timeliness requirement for 
compensation. Perhaps most strikingly, the percentage of constitutions that 
require prior compensation has decreased over time, from about 56.5% in 
1946 to 31.6% today. By contrast, the number of countries that require 
prompt compensation has increased since the 1960s, so that, today, 20.3% 
of all constitutions that include a compensation requirement demand 
prompt compensation. 
FIGURE 2: TIMELINESS OF COMPENSATION 
 
D. Due Process Requirement 
Takings clauses also vary in whether they include a due process 
requirement, that is, a requirement that certain procedures are followed in 
order to expropriate property. Such a due process requirement can take 
different forms. Some constitutions require that expropriation be done by 
law,96 while others state that nobody should be deprived of property 
“without due process of law,”97 or that expropriation should be done on 
 
96 Art. 17, CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.) (“Property may not be violated, and no 
inhabitant of the Nation can be deprived of it except by virtue of a sentence based on law. Expropriation 
for reasons of public interest must be authorized by law and previously compensated.”). 
97 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO Aug. 1, 1976, § 4 (“[T]he right 
of the individual to life, liberty, security of the person and enjoyment of property and the right not to be 
deprived thereof except by due process of law.”). 
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“just terms.”98 Figure 3 reveals that most takings clauses have always 
included some version of a due process requirement. Currently, 90.4% of 
all constitutions with a takings clause include such a requirement and the 
prevalence of this requirement has been similar in past decades. 
Some constitutions not only include a general due process guarantee, 
but also explicitly demand judicial involvement in expropriation. By doing 
so, constitution-makers ensure the involvement of a neutral and 
independent arbiter in disputes between the government and private 
property holders, thus making it harder for the government to expropriate 
arbitrarily. Figure 3 reveals that currently 36.7% of all constitutions with a 
takings clause explicitly require judicial involvement in expropriation, and 
that this number has steadily increased over time. 
 
FIGURE 3: DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS WITH EXPROPRIATIONS 
INCLUDING JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT 
 
E. Public Interest Requirement 
Many constitutions that contain a takings clause not only require the 
government to follow certain procedural requirements, but also place 
substantive limitations on the conditions under which the government can 
expropriate, by requiring that expropriation serves a public interest. Such 
substantive restrictions on expropriation arguably make it harder to 
expropriate. 
 
98 AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 51 (“The acquisition of property on just terms from any State or 
person for any purpose in respect of which the Parliament has power to make laws . . . .”). 
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Figure 4 depicts the percentage of countries whose takings clause 
stipulates a public interest requirement. It reveals that constitutions 
commonly require expropriation to serve the public interest. Notably, the 
graph also reveals that the prevalence of public interest guarantees 
decreased in the 1970s and 1980, but increased again in the 1990s.99 Today, 
85.9% of all constitutions with a takings clause include a public interest 
requirement. 
 
FIGURE 4: PUBLIC INTEREST REQUIREMENT WITH EXPROPRIATION 
 
F. Towards an Expropriation Index 
Some takings clauses offer stronger procedural and substantive 
protections against expropriation than others. To capture the extent to 
which any given constitution protects against expropriation, the variables 
discussed above can be combined into a single expropriation index. 
Specifically, a country receives the value of 0 if it does not have a takings 
clause, or when it does not provide any of the substantive or procedural 
limits on takings discussed above. Countries receive one additional point 
when: 
 
• The takings clause requires compensation. 
• The takings clause requires “full” or “market value” 
 
99 The declining popularity of these requirements in the 1970s and 1980s might reflect the 
nationalization movement during this period, while the increase in the 1990s presumably reflects the 
wave of neo-liberal constitutional reforms at this time. 
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compensation. 
• The takings clause requires timely compensation. 
• The takings clause requires prior compensation. 
• The takings clause contains a due process requirement. 
• The takings clause requires judicial involvement in 
expropriation. 
• The takings clause includes a public interest requirement. 
 
The resulting additive scale is based on the assumption that each of 
these individual components are desirable from an investor’s perspective 
and that the constitutional adoption of more of the features listed above 
makes private property more secure from government intervention. At the 
same time, it does not assume that some provisions serve as a precondition 
for the fulfillment of other provisions, or that without some of these 
provisions property rights would be undermined entirely. The resulting 
additive scale ranges from 0 to 7. It has a scale reliability coefficient of 
0.78 (“Cronbach’s alpha”), which means that the correlation between this 
scale and all other possible seven-point scales that could be constructed 
from the same components is 0.78.100 
Figure 5 depicts the 2013 scores for all countries on a world map. A 
cursory glance at the world map suggests that some of the countries with 
the highest levels of property protections on paper are not necessarily those 
that are most respectful of private property in practice. The top three most 
protective constitutions in 2013 are those of Armenia, Greece, and Peru, all 
of which have a mediocre track record of respecting private property in 
practice. 
 
100 ROBERT F. DEVELLIS, SCALE DEVELOPMENT: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 109 (3d ed. 2012) 
(describing an alpha coefficient between 0.70 and 0.80 as “respectable”). A different way to construct 
this index is through factor analysis. Specifically, when performing common factor analysis with an 
orthogonal rotation, it turns out that one latent factor explains about 79% of the shared variation of the 
various items in the scale. Both the scree elbow test and the Kaiser test moreover suggest that only one 
factor should be retained. Id. at 128–32. When using factor scores on the first factor instead of the 
additive scale in the analysis reported below, the results remain similar. The remainder of this Essay 
will use the additive scale in the primary analysis because it is easier to interpret. See note 124 supra for 
a discussion of the results when using factor scores instead of the additive scale.  
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FIGURE 5: WORLD MAP (2013) 
 
G. Fine Print 
Some constitutions enshrine provisions that contradict the procedural 
and substantive guarantees against expropriation included in the main 
takings clause. Specifically, some constitutions include “fine print” that is 
typically separated from the main takings clause, but that nonetheless could 
be used to circumvent the guarantees in the main takings clause. 
To a careful reader, a number of provisions might stand out as red 
flags that suggest that constitution-makers carved out exceptions to the 
main takings clause. These provisions serve as fine print to the main 
takings clause. Although there is no single way to draft fine print, there are 
some fairly standard provisions that appear in multiple constitutions and 
that lend themselves to quantitative coding. 
Particularly suspicious are the provisions that define different property 
types (such as communal and public property, in addition to private 
property) and essentially provide a narrow definition of the private property 
protected by the takings clause. These provisions are typically found in a 
section with general principles and policies and not the bill of rights itself, 
and are thus separated from the main takings clause. Also suspicious are 
provisions that place various restrictions on landownership or that 
contemplate land reform. To a careful reader, these provisions reveal that 
land titles might be less secure than the general takings clause suggests. 
Policies related to land reform are usually not part of the bill of rights, but 
are typically placed in a section that sets forth principles for state policy. 
Another category of suspicious provisions comprises those that provide a 
separate property regime for foreigners. These provisions do not deprive 
foreigners of their property entirely, but subject them to a different legal 
regime that could make them more vulnerable to expropriation. The 
constitutional arrangements for foreigners, again, are not usually placed in 
the bill of rights but in a section on government policy. 
Potentially also suspicious are limitations clauses that state that 
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property should serve the common good. These provisions are different 
from the public interest requirement discussed in Part II.A in that they do 
not require that expropriation should serve a public interest, but rather 
make a sweeping statement that all property is subordinate to the public 
good. These clauses therefore have the potential to undermine property 
protections entirely: whenever a government declares something to serve 
the common good, private property can be curtailed. These statements, 
however, are fairly common: today, they are enshrined in about one-third 
of all constitutions with a takings clause. What is more, these statements 
are usually included in the takings clause itself, making it more difficult to 
regard them as “fine print” that was added to the constitution to undermine 
the main takings clause. For these reasons, the common good clauses are 
not classified as “fine print,” at least not for the initial exploration of the 
data.101 
Another design feature for which it is unclear whether or not to treat it 
as fine print is the location of the main takings clause. Specifically, 
although most constitutions include the takings clause in the bill of rights, 
some place it in a different part of their constitution, such as the preamble. 
On the one hand, placing the takings clause outside the bill of rights could 
make it easier for states to circumvent the takings clause, as usually only 
the rights enshrined in the bill of rights are subject to judicial review. On 
the other hand, a number of countries place all constitutional rights in their 
preamble, making it difficult to predict whether this is indeed a strategy to 
circumvent the takings clause. For this reason, the location of takings 
clauses is not treated as fine print, at least not for the initial exploration of 
the data. Notably, the findings presented in the next Part do not depend on 
these classification decisions and they remain similar when reclassifying 
either or both of these features (that is, the common good clause and the 
location of the takings clause) as fine print.102 
Figure 6 depicts the prevalence of each of the main fine print 
provisions: (1) different types of property, (2) land restrictions, (3) land 
reform, and (4) a separate property regimes for foreigners. It reveals that 
none of these provisions are very common, and that most appear in 
somewhere between 10% and 20% of all constitutions. Notably, many of 
the constitutions that include fine print include more than one of these 
provisions at once. The graph also reveals an upward trajectory for all 
features from the 1960s to the 1980s, with the fine provisions reaching the 
height of their popularity in the late 1980s, and revealing a decline in their 
 
101 Instead, these clauses are treated as ordinary limitation clauses. See Law & Versteeg, Sham 
Constitutions, supra note 16, at 933 (showing empirically that constitutional rights almost universally 
come with limitations clauses).  
102 See infra Part IV.A. 
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prevalence from the 1990s onwards. This trajectory suggests that the fine 
print provisions are linked to the rise and fall of socialist constitutions. At 
the same time, the enduring prevalence of such provisions up till this date 
suggests that they are not simply a feature of socialist systems but 
withstood the “end of history,”103 and remain prevalent in the constitutions 
of purportedly free market economies today. 
FIGURE 6: TAKINGS CLAUSES’ FINE PRINT 
 
 
It is noteworthy that fine print provisions are often accompanied by a 
generous takings clause. Indeed, among the countries that include one or 
more of the fine print provisions identified above, the average score on the 
expropriation index is above the global average. Over the course of the 
period 1946–2013, the average score on the expropriation index was 3.21. 
Among countries with fine print provisions in their constitution, by 
contrast, it was 3.31, while among countries without fine print it was 
3.16.104 This suggests that these provisions reflect genuine contradictions in 
the constitution’s design. 
III. FROM DE JURE TO DE FACTO 
A comparison of how takings clauses measure up with actual respect 
for property rights requires data on de facto expropriation risks in each 
country. A commonly used measure to capture de facto respect for private 
 
103 See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN, at xi (2006) (arguing that 
the fall of socialism and the triumph of liberal democracy in the 1990s marked “the end of history”). 
104 A t-test suggests that this difference in means is statistically significant at the 5% level.  
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property is the “risk of expropriation index” from the International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG).105 The ICRG is prepared by the Political Risk Services 
(PRS) Group, which is a commercial provider of political and country risks 
forecasts to international investors.106 The ICRG consists of a range of 
variables that capture monthly information on the political, economic, and 
financial risks associated with investing in any given country. It is 
compiled by a team of country analysts that draw on a range of different 
sources.107 Importantly, the ICRG assesses actual investment risks in a 
country and not constitutional takings clauses. This study uses the ICRG 
variable that specifically captures the risks of expropriation, and that does 
not include other types of political risks faced by investors. This variable is 
based on an expert assessment of how secure private property is from 
government intervention.108 It ranges from zero to ten, with zero indicating 
the lowest level of protection against government expropriation. 
A cursory exploration of the data suggests that there is virtually no 
relationship between the de jure expropriation index and the de facto risk of 
expropriation. The correlation coefficient between the two variables 
is -0.028, which suggests that the two measures are largely unrelated, and 
 
105 The risk of expropriation index is also used by Acemoglu et al., Colonial Origins, supra note 1, 
at 1370, and Acemoglu & Johnson, supra note 5, at 958. A number of studies also include other ICRG 
variables (such as rule of law, and quality of the bureaucracy or corruption) to capture the protection of 
property rights. See, e.g., Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, Institutions and Economic Performance: 
Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures, 7 ECON. & POL. 207 (1995); Keefer & 
Knack, supra note 1; Melton, supra note 59. Such an approach, however, seems imprecise and 
overinclusive, especially since the ICRG provides data on the risk of expropriation specifically. Another 
possible measure is the private property index constructed by the Heritage Foundation. However, this 
measure not only captures the risk of expropriation by the government, but also captures the degree to 
which property is secure in the relationships and transactions between private actors. See Acemoglu & 
Johnson, supra note 5, at 958. This measure is therefore less appropriate for my purposes.  
106 I thank Michael Burke from the Political Risk Services Group for answering my numerous 
questions on the International Country Risk Guide’s risk of expropriation data. 
107 See The PRS Group, International Country Risk Guide, https://www.prsgroup.com/about-us/
our-two-methodologies/icrg [https://perma.cc/ZLU6-KDEZ]. This data is used, among others, in 
Acemoglu & Johnson, supra note 5, at 958; Thorsten Beck et al., Law, Endowments, and Finance, 70 J. 
FIN. ECON. 137, 138 (2003); Simeon Djankov et al., The Regulation of Entry, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1, 3 
(2002); and Rafael La Porta et al., The Quality of Government, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 222, 222 (1999). 
108 Note that this is specifically coded as risks of expropriation of investors’ property, but this is 
likely to be highly correlated with property in general. Indeed prior studies use the index to measure 
property rights in general rather than investors’ property rights specifically. See, e.g., Acemoglu et al., 
Colonial Origins, supra note 1. The ICRG provides investment risks on a monthly basis. I create an 
annual expropriation risk measure by taking the average of the monthly data. The PRS Group changed 
its methodology for creating the expropriation risk variable in the late 1990s. At that point, the 
expropriation risks variable was renamed to “contract viability,” and broadened in scope to include the 
viability of contracts with the government in addition to risk of expropriation. The original variable 
covers the period of 1984–1997, while the new variable is available from 2001 to 2013. The following 
analysis accounts for the difference in data collection by including a post-1997 dummy variable that 
controls for changes in coding methodology. 
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that, if anything, their relationship is negative, meaning that a higher score 
on the de jure expropriation index is associated lower de facto protection 
against government expropriation. Figure 7 plots the de jure and de facto 
scores for the year 2013. The horizontal and vertical lines denote the 
average de jure and de facto scores in this year, while the dashed trend line 
reveals a negative but weak relationship between de jure and de facto 
protections (the correlation coefficient for 2013 is -0.21). 
A substantial number of countries are clustered in the top left quadrant 
of Figure 7, meaning that they place stronger restrictions on the power of 
eminent domain on paper than in practice. These are the countries that 
might have adopted takings clauses for disingenuous reasons or where the 
adoption of takings clauses was surrounded by substantial societal 
disagreements. Another group of countries, however, is clustered in the 
bottom right quadrant, suggesting that these countries protect property de 
facto even though they place only few constitutional restrictions on the 
power of eminent domain. Although the theoretical discussion thus far has 
focused mainly on the first group (the “false positives,” that is, countries 
that offer higher levels of protection on paper than in practice) the 
empirical analysis in Part IV.B will provide a preliminary exploration of 
the second group (the “false negatives,” that is, countries that offer higher 
levels of protection in practice than on paper).  
Of course, this simple graph does not take account of other 
determinants of expropriation that might be correlated with the 
constitutional restrictions on the power of eminent domain. Regression 
analysis is used to control for such confounding factors. Even with 
regression analysis, causal questions on the impact of constitutional 
protections are “notoriously complex and difficult to resolve.”109 To know 
that takings clauses are related to de facto expropriation risks does not 
necessarily indicate whether takings clauses actually influence de facto 
expropriation risks or are merely correlated with them.110 Nevertheless, 
correlations can shed light upon the plausibility of certain hypotheses and 
inform subsequent interpretations on whether takings clauses matter.111 
Conversely, a lack of statistically significant correlation between 
constitutional takings clauses and de facto expropriation risks suggests that 
it is unlikely that they are related.  
 
109 Law & Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, supra note 16, at 919; see also Anne Meuwese & Mila 
Versteeg, Quantitative Methods for Comparative Constitutional Law, in PRACTICE AND THEORY IN 
COMPARATIVE LAW 230, 233 (Maurice Adams & Jacco Bomhoff eds., 2012) (discussing the difficulty 
of distinguishing correlation from causation). 
110 See Law & Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, supra note 16, at 919. 
111 Id.  
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FIGURE 7: SCATTER PLOT DE JURE AND DE FACTO FOR 2-13112 
 
 
To explore the relationship between de jure takings clauses and de 
facto expropriation risks, I estimate a simple linear regression model with 
robust standard errors clustered at the country level,113 country fixed-
effects, and a set of predictor variables that are common in the literature. 
These predictor variables are: (1) the level of democracy;114 (2) log GDP 
per capita; (3) the degree to which the judiciary is independent;115 (4) 
whether the country formally recognizes the power of judicial review;116 
and (5) a post-1997 dummy to control for the change in coding 
methodology of the dependent variable after 1997 by the ICRG.117 Of 
 
112 The labels depict ISO-3 country codes. 
113 The risk of expropriation index ranges from 0 to 10, but takes 126 different values, making it 
continuous in nature. 
114 My measure of a country’s level of democracy is the “polity2” variable from the Polity IV data 
set, which is widely used by political scientists. This variable ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to 
-10 (strongly autocratic). See MONTY G. MARSHALL & KEITH JAGGERS, POLITY IV PROJECT: DATASET 
USER’S MANUAL 8 (2007), available at http://home.bi.no/a0110709/PolityIV_manual.pdf. [http://
perma.cc/AX5J-QARF]. 
115 To access the Cinganelli–Richards Human Rights Dataset, see David L. Cingranelli et al., The 
CIRI Human Rights Dataset, CIRI HUM. RIGHTS DATA PROJECT, http://www.humanrightsdata.com/p/
data-documentation.html [http://perma.cc/S7RL-DFYF]. To access the Coding Manual, see DAVID L. 
CINGRANELLI & DAVID L. RICHARDS, THE CINGRANELLI–RICHARDS (CIRI) HUMAN RIGHTS DATA 
PROJECT CODING MANUAL (2014), https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BxDpF6GQ-6fbWkpxTDZCQ
01jYnc [https://perma.cc/86SC-NWQQ].  
116 See Tom Ginsburg & Mila Versteeg, Why Do Countries Adopt Constitutional Review, 30 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 587 (2014). 
117 See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
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course, the model also includes the main variable of interest: (6) the 
constitutional restrictions on the power of eminent domain as captured by 
the de jure expropriation index. 
Figure 8 depicts the coefficients along with the 95% confidence 
intervals for the predictor variables included in this model. The stars 
superimposed upon the graph denote p-values of  <0.01 (***), <0.05 (**), 
and <0.1 (*), respectively. The graph should be interpreted as follows: we 
are 95% certain that the true value of the parameter lies somewhere on the 
depicted line. The graph reveals that there appears to be no observable 
relationship between de jure constitutional takings provisions and de facto 
expropriation risks.  
Failure to reject the null hypothesis—that constitutional takings 
clauses do not reduce de facto expropriation risks—does not necessarily 
offer evidence for the null hypothesis. Just because the de jure 
expropriation index is not statistically significantly associated with de facto 
expropriation risks, does not necessarily mean that the variable has no 
effect.118  Specifically, it is possible that the effect of this variable is 
substantively large but fails to achieve statistical significance because the 
model is imprecisely estimated. This does not appear to be the case here: 
Figure 8 reveals that the coefficient of the expropriation index is close to 
zero and that the confidence intervals also fall around zero (95% 
confidence intervals: -0.13 to 0.22). This suggests that the effect of de jure 
takings clauses is not only statistically insignificant but also small in 
substantive terms. Thus, placing more restrictions on the power of eminent 
domain does not appear to improve property protections in practice.  
By contrast, democracy, GDP per capita, and judicial independence 
are all statistically significantly associated with de facto expropriation 
risks. The findings that democratic countries, richer countries, and 
countries with more judicial independence do a better job at protecting 
private property are all consistent with the existing literature.119 
 
118 See Adam S. Chilton & Mila Versteeg, The Failure of Constitutional Torture Prohibitions 22 
(Univ. of Chi. Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 712, 2014), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2540701 [http://perma.cc/G52P-PRPN]. 
119 A number of alternative regression specifications yield similar results. First, when replacing the 
additive property rights scale with the predicted values for each country-year on the first factor, 
obtained through common factor analysis with an orthogonal rotation, the results remain similar. See 
supra note 107 (documenting the scale reliability coefficient and providing additional details on the 
factor analysis). Second, when adding year fixed-effects to the baseline model, the results remain 
similar. Third, when adding a linear time trend to the baseline model, the results remain similar. Finally, 
replacing the country fixed-effects with a lagged dependent variable, the effect of the property rights 
index becomes statistically significant at the 5% level but with a negative sign. This suggests that, if 
anything, a higher de jure score is associated with higher de facto expropriation risks. 
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FIGURE 8: BASELINE REGRESSION OUTPUT 
(COEFFICIENTS AND 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS)120 
 
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 
 
Not only is the overall de jure expropriation index unrelated to actual 
property protections, but the same is true for the individual components. 
When correlating each of the individual components of the expropriation 
index with de facto expropriation risks (depicted in Table 1), most 
correlations are close to zero, and in some cases negative. The one 
exception is for provisions that unambiguously require “full” or “market 
value” compensation. The correlation between this provision and the de 
facto expropriation index is 0.18. However, this provision is not 
statistically significantly associated with de facto expropriation risks after 
controlling for confounding factors in the same regression model reported 
in Figure 8.121 
 
 
120 This regression model includes 2523 observations and has an r-squared of 0.61. 
121 The same is true for the other components of the de jure expropriation index: none of these are 
statistically significant when included in the model from Figure 8 instead of the aggregate index. 
 
109:695 (2015) Politics of Takings 
729 
TABLE 1: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN DIFFERENT TAKINGS GUARANTEES 
AND DE FACTO EXPROPRIATION RISKS 
 De Facto Expropriation Risk 
Full Compensation 0.1758 
Some Compensation -0.0234 
Timeliness -0.1147 
Prior Compensation -0.0709 
Procedural Guarantees 0.0518 
Judicial Involvement -0.0807 
Public Interest Requirement 0.0159 
 
In sum, the data reveals that constitutional restrictions on the power of 
eminent domain do not appear to affect de facto expropriation risks. 
IV. CONDITIONAL EFFECTS: FALSE POSITIVES AND FALSE NEGATIVES 
Although the substantive and procedural restrictions on the power of 
eminent domain appear to have little impact on de facto expropriation risks, 
it is possible that they affect government behavior only under certain 
conditions. This Part will first explore the theoretical explanations 
developed in Part I, which all concern “false positives,” that is, countries 
that adopt takings clauses in the absence of a genuine commitment to 
protect private property in practice, either because the commitment is 
entirely false or because it is surrounded by societal disagreements. This 
Part will next provide a preliminary exploration of possible “false 
negatives,” that is, countries that are committed to private property in 
practice but do not enshrine strong restrictions on eminent domain in their 
constitution. 
A. False Positives 
One possible explanation for the lack of correlation between de jure 
and de facto property protections is that some constitutions are simply 
disingenuous. When constitutional promises are false, the mechanisms that 
are supposed to make it harder to deviate from the constitution’s promises 
ex post are likely to be absent.122 If not, the government risks that the false 
promises will be turned against it.123 One of the most important 
mechanisms to make constitutional promises binding is judicial 
independence. As noted in Part I.B, an independent judiciary can act as a 
 
122 See supra Part I.A (singling out the availability of judicial review, the difficulty of 
constitutional amendment, and the unwillingness to forgo coordination benefits as such mechanisms). 
123 See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text (recounting the Egyptian experience). 
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neutral arbiter in property disputes between the government and private 
parties and can strike down unconstitutional legislation. It is no surprise, 
therefore, that investors have long used judicial independence as a proxy 
for whether their investments are secure. 
To explore whether the effects of takings clauses depend on judicial 
independence, I re-estimate the model reported in Figure 8 but with a more 
limited sample that only includes the 40% of countries that enjoy the 
highest level of judicial independence according to the CIRI human rights 
dataset. The CIRI data codes judicial independence on a three-point scale—
full independence, moderate independence, and no independence—based 
on the annual United States State Department Country Reports on Human 
Rights, the input for which is collected by American embassies around the 
world.124 The results, displayed in Figure 9, suggest that there is no 
evidence that the substantive and procedural restrictions on expropriation 
reduce expropriation risks in countries with high levels of judicial 
independence.125 The coefficient of the expropriation index is close to zero 
and not statistically significant. By contrast, democracy and GDP per capita 
are again positive and statistically significant predictors of de facto 
protection against expropriation.126 Thus, even when omitting those states 
that adopt takings clauses in the absence of an independent judiciary, de 
jure restrictions on eminent domain and de facto expropriation risks appear 
to be unrelated to each other.127 
 
124 See supra note 121. For a description of this methodology, see Benedikt Goderis & Mila 
Versteeg, Human Rights Violations After 9/11 and the Role of Constitutional Constraints, 41 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 131, 150–51 (2012). 
125 Also when limiting the sample to the 75% of countries with either high levels of judicial 
independence or medium levels of judicial independence (omitting only the 25% of countries with the 
lowest levels of judicial independence), constitutional takings provisions have no effect. I also explore 
whether the presence of judicial review makes a difference. First, I limit the sample to countries that 
have the highest level of judicial independence and grant the judiciary the power of judicial review (as 
coded by Ginsburg & Versteeg, supra note 122). Second, I limit the sample to countries that have the 
highest or medium levels of judicial independence and grant the judiciary the power of judicial review. 
In both cases, there is still no effect of constitutional takings clauses. 
126 The 95% confidence intervals for the expropriation index are larger than for the baseline model 
presented in Figure 8 (95% confidence interval: 0.20 to 0.64), raising the possibility that there exists a 
substantively meaningful but imprecisely estimated effect. 
127 Although judicial independence is the main focus of the comparative constitutional law 
literature, it is not the only mechanism that can make constitutional constraints binding. Another 
potential mechanism is democracy. Constitutional commitments can be enforced through the 
democratic process, especially when these commitments are majoritarian in nature. Thus, when takings 
clauses reflect majoritarian preferences, they might effectively reduce expropriation risks in democratic 
countries. Conversely, authoritarian regimes might adopt takings clauses for disingenuous reasons, 
suggesting that takings clauses in authoritarian regimes will fail to reduce expropriation risks. To 
explore democracy’s impact, I re-estimate the model reported in Figure 8 for a subsample of democratic 
and autocratic countries respectively. Countries with a polity score of six or higher are considered to be 
democratic for this purpose. This threshold is commonly used in the literature. See, e.g., Simmons, 
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FIGURE 9: SUB-SAMPLE OF COUNTRIES WITH FULLY INDEPENDENT JUDICIARIES ONLY 
(COEFFICIENTS AND 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS)128 
 
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 
 
A second explanation for the lack of correlation between de jure and 
de facto property protections holds that, in some countries, constitutional 
restrictions on the power of eminent domain might enjoy only partial 
popular support. Where the constitution places stronger restrictions on the 
power of eminent domain than the level of restrictions preferred by a 
majority of people, political majorities might use their political clout to 
undermine the constitution’s takings clause. It is difficult to assess whether 
constitutions are elite products that deviate from popular opinion; such an 
assessment requires in-depth case studies, which are beyond the scope of 
this Essay.129 Although it is difficult to establish which groups were most 
influential in writing the constitution, it is relatively easy to detect the 
ambiguities that are built into the constitution’s design. As discussed, 
 
supra note 15, at 83; Law & Versteeg, supra note 46, at 178. In neither one of these samples, however, 
is the de jure expropriation index statistically significantly correlated with de facto expropriation risks. 
In other words, takings clauses in democratic and autocratic constitutions alike fail to reduce de facto 
expropriation risks. For the subsample of democratic countries, observations (N) = 1319 and the r-
squared is 0.64. For the subsample of autocratic countries, N = 1204 and the r-squared is 0.59. When  
classifying countries with a polity2 score of 4 or higher as democratic, the results are the same. 
128 This model includes 905 observations and has an r-squared of 0.79. 
129 At the same time, the finding that takings clauses fail to matter even in democracies hints at the 
possibility that takings clauses lack popular support. See supra note 133. Further research is needed to 
explore this possibility. 
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numerous constitutions include ambiguities and contradictions that lend 
themselves to quantitative coding. 
To explore the impact of such ambiguities, I re-estimate the model 
reported in Figure 8 but with a more limited sample that only includes the 
77% of countries that do not include any fine print in their constitutions at 
all. The results, depicted in Figure 10, suggest that when accounting for the 
constitution’s fine print, there does exist a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between de jure takings clauses and reduced de 
facto expropriation risks. In the subsample of countries without fine print, 
the de jure expropriation index is positive and statistically significant, albeit 
only at the 10%-level.130 Specifically, a 1-point increase on the 
expropriation index (that ranges from 0 to 7, and for which 7 denotes the 
highest level of protection) is associated with a 0.18-point increase on the 
de facto risk of expropriation measure (that ranges from 0 to 10; and for 
which 10 denotes the highest level of protection). By contrast, in the 
subsample that only includes the constitutions with fine print (reported in 
Figure 11), the original expropriation index has a negative effect, although 
not statistically significant.131 In other words, these findings suggest that 
when constitutions unambiguously protect private property, more 
restrictions on the power of eminent domain are correlated with a 
statistically significant decrease in expropriation risks. Yet where 
constitutions include “fine print” ambiguities, which can potentially water 
down restrictions on the power of eminent domain, de jure takings clauses 
do not appear to cause a reduction in expropriation risks. 
 
130 The significance level increases when using alternative definitions of fine print. See supra notes 
144–46 and accompanying text.  
131 Note, however, that the 95 % confidence intervals for the expropriation index are fairly large in 
this specification (95% confidence intervals: -0.65 to 0.27) raising the possibility that the expropriation 
index has a substantively meaningful negative effect that is imprecisely estimated. As an alternative 
strategy, I also explored the effect of the fine print by estimating the regression model reported in 
Figure 8 with an alternative expropriation index that is adjusted downward to zero whenever one of the 
red-flag provisions is present in the constitution, but that takes its original value otherwise. When doing 
so, there is a positive relationship between de jure takings clauses and reduced de facto risk of 
expropriation, but the p-value is 0.15, suggesting it falls just outside conventional levels of statistical 
significance. 
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FIGURE 10: SUB-SAMPLE OF COUNTRIES WITHOUT FINE PRINT  
(COEFFICIENTS AND 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS)132 
 
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 
FIGURE 11: SUB-SAMPLE OF COUNTRIES WITH FINE PRINT  
(COEFFICIENTS AND 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS)133 
 
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 
 
 
132 This model includes 1484 observations and has an r-squared of 0.67. 
133 This model includes 1039 observations and has an r-squared 0.44. 
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These effects become even stronger when adding two constitutional 
features for which it was not a priori clear whether they should be classified 
as “fine print” to the group of constitutions that include fine print: 
(1) limitation clauses that make property subordinate to the common good 
and (2) constitutions that place the takings clause outside the bill of rights. 
To explore the impact of these features, I first repeat the analysis reported 
in Figures 10 and 11 but add the constitutions that place the takings clause 
outside the bill of rights to the subset of constitutions with fine print. When 
doing so, the de jure expropriation index is positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level in the subsample of countries without fine print 
in their constitutions, while it is negative but statistically insignificant in 
the sample of countries with fine print.134 I next repeat the analysis reported 
in Figures 10 and 11 but add the clauses that subordinate private property 
to the common good to the definition of fine print. When doing so, the de 
jure expropriation index is positive and statistically significant at the 5% 
level in the sample of countries without fine print in their constitutions, 
while it is negative but statistically insignificant in the sample of countries 
with fine print.135 Finally, I repeat the analysis reported in Figures 10 and 
11 but add both types of provisions to the definition of fine print. Also in 
this case, the de jure expropriation index is positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level in the subsample of countries without fine print 
in their constitutions and negative but not significant in the sample with 
fine print.136 This suggests that the overall finding that societal 
disagreements matter is robust compared to alternative definitions of what 
constitutes the constitution’s fine print. Indeed, the various provisions that 
capture fine print are all positively correlated with each other.137 
Taken together, these findings suggest that when constitutions include 
contradictory property provisions, the exceptions become the rule, and the 
main takings clause will be undermined in practice. At the same time, when 
countries commit to protect private property without caveats, constitutional 
restrictions on eminent domain do appear to be correlated with de facto 
expropriation risks. Of course, the analysis does not conclusively establish 
that constitutional contradictions indeed result from societal disagreements. 
 
134 This model includes 1230 observations and has an r-squared of 0.67. The coefficient of the de 
jure expropriation index in this sample without fine print is 0.20 (compared with 0.18 in Figure 10). 
135 This model includes 1196 observations and has an r-squared of 0.67. The coefficient of the de 
jure expropriation index in this sample without fine print is 0.21 (compared with 0.18 in Figure 10). 
136 This model includes 961 observations and has an r-squared of 0.66. The coefficient of the de 
jure expropriation index in this sample without fine print is 0.22 (compared with 0.18 in Figure 10). 
137 Performing common factor analysis with a varimax rotation on all the possible fine print 
provisions suggests that one underlying factor accounts for all of the shared variance among the 
different fine print variables. Both the Kaiser test and scree elbow test moreover reveal that for this 
data, one factor should be retained. See DEVELLIS, supra note 107, at 128–32. 
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Nor does it sufficiently address possible endogeneity of takings clauses to 
draw any definite conclusions about the causes of these clauses’ impact. 
Yet, this Essay’s findings at least tentatively suggest that the politics at the 
time of constitution-writing could be a crucially important predictor of 
takings clauses’ future performance. 
B. False Negatives 
The analysis thus far has focused exclusively on “false positives,” that 
is, countries that adopt constitutional takings clauses without a genuine 
commitment to respect private property in practice.138 The focus on false 
positives follows logically from the theoretical literature on property rights, 
which emphasizes the economic benefits associated with constitutional 
restrictions on the power of eminent domain. The literature therefore 
predicts that countries will be incentivized to constitutionally restrict 
eminent domain power, and invites a focus on why such restrictions do not 
work in practice. Yet it is possible that the lack of correlation between de 
jure and de facto property rights is in part explained by what Professor 
Simmons describes as “false negatives,” that is, countries that respect 
private property in practice and yet do not place constitutional restrictions 
on the power of eminent domain.139 There is no clear theoretical foundation 
for this phenomenon; the conventional wisdom, after all, holds that 
countries that genuinely intend to respect and protect private property 
benefit from adopting constitutional takings clauses. Constitutional takings 
clauses, after all, signal credibility to investors, capital markets, and 
citizens alike, which might help a government to reap the economic 
benefits associated with secure property rights. 
Yet, Figure 7 suggests that at least some countries overperform 
relative to their constitutional promises. One possible group of countries 
that might be reluctant to enshrine takings clauses into their constitutions, 
even when they do respect private property in practice, are the common law 
countries. Common law countries typically have a strong tradition of 
judicial interpretation of constitutional text, and may therefore omit some 
of the more specific restrictions on the power of eminent domain from the 
text itself. To explore this possibility, I estimate the same baseline model as 
reported in Figure 8, but exclude the common law countries from the 
sample. This exercise reveals no evidence that common law countries drive 
the results. Also in this restricted sample, the de jure restrictions on the 
power of eminent domain do not explain de facto expropriation risks.140 In 
 
138 See SIMMONS, supra note 15, at 17–18. 
139 Id. 
140  This model includes 1746 observations and has an r-squared of 0.60.  
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other words, even when excluding common law countries as possible false 
negatives, there is no relationship between constitutional takings clauses 
and reduced expropriation risks. 
A second possible group of “false negatives” are those countries that 
possess “modest” constitutions.141 Modest constitutions are characterized 
by an absence of rights protections in the constitutional text even when 
those rights are protected in practice. The phenomenon of the modest 
constitution suggests that some countries are generally reluctant to enshrine 
rights in their constitution, which might also affect the degree to which they 
adopt property rights. Law and Versteeg classify a portion of the world’s 
constitutions as modest based on their assessment of each constitution’s 
performance on fifteen individual rights (not including property rights).142 
To explore whether modest constitutions affect the results, I re-estimate the 
model reported in Figure 8, but exclude all the modest constitutions from 
the sample. This exercise reveals that even in this more restricted sample, 
de jure restrictions on the power of eminent domain and de facto 
expropriation risks are not statistically significantly correlated with each 
other.143 Overall, this initial analysis reveals no evidence to suggest that the 
disconnect between de jure and de facto property rights is caused by false 
negatives. 
CONCLUSION 
There exists a longstanding debate over whether constitutions are more 
than mere parchment barriers. Though the debate traces back to at least 
James Madison, remarkably little is known about the circumstances under 
which constitutions actually matter. This Essay has offered an initial 
empirical exploration of this question in the context of constitutional 
takings clauses. It finds that takings clauses seen in isolation convey little 
information on the degree to which private property is in fact secure from 
government expropriation. Indeed, even takings clauses that are interpreted 
and enforced by an independent judiciary do not seem to reduce de facto 
expropriation risks. Yet, when taking into account the constitution’s fine 
print, there does appear to be a relationship between the de jure restrictions 
on expropriation and de facto expropriation risks. 
It is important to note that this Essay does not exhaust the topic. 
Although it establishes with some certainty that there is no relationship 
between de jure and de facto expropriation risks in the aggregate, it has not 
explored all possible conditions under which takings clauses might make a 
 
141 Law & Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, supra note 16, at 882. 
142 Id. at 883–85.  
143 This model includes 2332 observations and has an r-squared of 0.59. 
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difference. In recent years, there has been a growing consensus that when 
empirically exploring the effectiveness of de jure rights, researchers should 
not focus on aggregate effects in all countries, but rather explore the 
conditions under which rights do matter.144 This Essay has merely brushed 
the surface of such an inquiry by examining a limited number of possible 
conditions, relating to judicial independence and ambiguities in the 
constitution’s design. Future research is needed to delve further into the 
conditions under which takings clauses might make a difference in 
practice.145 
Even with those limitations in mind, this Essay reveals an important 
theoretical point. With its focus on the politics surrounding the 
constitution’s adoption, this Essay fits with what Professor Hirschl has 
dubbed the “realist” tradition in comparative constitutional law, that is, a 
growing number of studies that explore how politics affect a constitution’s 
substance.146 Well-known studies in the realist tradition have explored how 
elites, ruling coalitions, or both were able to shape a constitution’s design 
to fit their own preferences. Some qualitative studies have even focused 
specifically on how societal disagreements produce contradictions and 
ambiguities.147 Yet, few studies have connected the politics of constitution-
making to the future operation of the constitution. While this short Essay 
leaves many questions unanswered, it suggests that the political conditions 
surrounding the constitution’s adoption could crucially impact the 
constitution’s future operation. It is possible that this dynamic is not unique 
to takings clauses alone, but also characterizes the operation of other 
constitutional commitments. More research is therefore needed on 
constitutions’ fine print and, more generally, on how the circumstances 
surrounding the constitution’s adoption affect its future operation. Indeed, 
it is possible that one of the most important predictors of constitutional 
success is not the substance of the document, but the conditions under 
which it was adopted. 
  
 
144 An example of a study that explores conditional effect is SIMMONS, supra note 15. 
145 This Essay also did not account for bilateral investment treaties (BITs), which often come with 
a standardized template for a constitutional takings clause. At least in theory, it is possible that takings 
clauses matter more when supplemented by BITs, or, alternatively, that BITs have an impact on de 
facto expropriation risks even when constitutional takings clauses do not. 
146 See Hirschl, Strategic Foundations, supra note 65, at 157–58; see also TOM GINSBURG, 
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 22–25 (2003) 
(discussing how strategic political considerations impact the establishment of judicial review). 
147 See supra Part I.B.2. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
738 
 
